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Interbank markets allow banks to cope with specific liquidity shocks. At the same 
time, they may be a channel allowing a bank default to spread to other banks. This paper 
analyzes how contagion propagates within the Italian interbank market using a unique data 
set including actual bilateral exposures. Since information on bilateral exposures was not 
available in most previous studies, they assumed that banks spread their lending as evenly as 
possible among all the other banks by maximizing the entropy of interbank linkages. Based 
on the data available on actual bilateral exposures for all Italian banks, the results obtained 
by assuming the maximum entropy are compared with those reflecting the observed 
structure of interbank claims. The comparison indicates that, in line with the thesis 
prevailing in the literature, the maximum entropy method tends to underestimate the extent 
of contagion. However, this does not hold in general. Under certain circumstances, 
depending on the structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of interbank 
exposures and banks’ capitalization, the maximum entropy approach overestimates the scope 
for contagion.  
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1. Introduction
1 
Systemic risk has always played a prominent role in the economic policy debate. A 
widely shared view is that the banking system is an important chain in the propagation of 
shocks to the entire economy.
2 Early theoretical works concerning systemic risk in the 
banking sector have focused on depositor runs triggered by self-fulfilling expectations 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) or by signals regarding bank solvency (Chari and Jagannathan, 
1988 and Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988). More recently, attention has been paid to 
financial contagion in the interbank market (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). While the interbank 
market may allow banks to cope with specific liquidity shocks (Bhattacharya and Gale, 
1987), interbank relationships may represent a channel for contagion: the economic distress 
of an insolvent bank may propagate to other banks through interbank linkages.
3 Recent 
theoretical works (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) have also 
highlighted that the propagation of shocks within the interbank market is dependent on the 
exact pattern of banks’ financial linkages.  
Many contributions have sought to measure the vulnerability of the interbank market 
to financial contagion.
4 However, these works suffer from two main data limitations. First, 
detailed data on banks’ bilateral exposures are generally not available. In order to 
circumvent this problem, two approaches have been adopted: a) the severity of financial 
contagion in the interbank market has been measured by focusing on a specific segment of 
                                                           
1 I am grateful to Ugo Albertazzi, Franklin Allen, Guglielmo Barone, Marcello Bofondi, Francesco 
Columba, Alessio D’Ignazio, Xavier Freixas, Eugenio Gaiotti, Leonardo Gambacorta, Andrea Generale, 
Giorgio Gobbi, Francesca Lotti, Christian Upper and Andreas Worms and two anonymous referees for helpful 
suggestions. I am greatly indebted to Paolo Angelini for having provided me with very useful comments at 
different stages of this work. I would also like to thank participants in the seminars at the Bank of Italy, at the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and at CSEF-University of Salerno, and participants in the workshop on “Systemic 
Risk in the Financial Sector” hosted by Collegium Budapest (Budapest, 2005) and in the 2006 European 
Meeting of the Econometric Society. The opinions expressed in this paper are mine and in no way involve the 
responsibility of the Bank of Italy. 
2 De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Kaufman (1994) provide a detailed discussion on the definition of 
systemic risk. 
3 A different channel for contagion through the interbank market could be related to signals or self-fulfilling 
expectations triggering interbank deposits withdrawals.  
4 See Upper (2007) and Appendix A for details of the literature on financial contagion.  
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the market for which actual bilateral exposures were available; in particular, Furfine (2003) 
has investigated contagion in the Federal Reserve’s large-value transfer system (Fedwire) 
which, however, represents a small fraction of U.S. total interbank exposures (according to 
Furfine himself, approximately 14 per cent); b) other contributions have taken into account 
the whole interbank market. However, since detailed information on banks’ bilateral 
exposures is not available, these works have had to assume a specific pattern for them. In 
particular, it is possible to distinguish between two different cases: i) interbank bilateral 
exposures are obtained on the basis of aggregated interbank assets and liabilities by 
maximising the entropy
5 of the matrix of bilateral claims (e.g. Upper and Worms, 2004) or 
ii) when information about large bilateral exposures is available, the entropy maximisation 
method is applied only to those elements of the matrix of bilateral exposures that are not 
known (Blavarg and Nimander, 2002; Wells, 2004; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007; van 
Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006). The main limitation of this approach is that it assumes a 
market structure which might be quite different from the actual one. Indeed, the 
maximisation of the entropy rules out lending relationships in the interbank market
6 since it 
assumes that each bank lends to all the other banks in the market.  
A second data limitation concerns the structure of the banking system. The existing 
literature has typically overlooked the fact that banks are often affiliated with a 
conglomerate, even if  this may, quite obviously, affect the resilience of the banking system 
to systemic shocks.  
In this paper, financial contagion in the interbank market is investigated using a unique 
data set including detailed information on each actual bilateral exposure for all the Italian 
banks.  Thus, the analysis deals with all kinds of interbank financial linkages, besides 
derivatives and shares, for every Italian bank and for each bank-to-bank relationship. 
According to the previous literature, the paper uses simulation techniques to measure the 
severity of financial contagion. 
                                                           
5 See Appendix B for details. 
6 Cocco et al. (2003) find evidence supporting the existence of lending relationships in the interbank market 
for overnight funds.   5
The paper contributes to the literature in two main respects. Firstly, it provides a 
measure of the vulnerability to financial contagion of the Italian interbank market,
7 thus 
enriching the evidence so far available for most of the industrialised countries. However, the 
analysis differs from those made for other countries as it is based on actual bilateral 
exposures instead of maximum entropy exposures. Furthermore, by taking into account the 
affiliation of banks with a conglomerate, it provides evidence on the link between financial 
conglomeration and banking system stability. The paper shows that even if the Italian 
interbank market is conducive to financial contagion it hardly triggers a systemic crisis. 
Banks conglomeration tends to improve the resilience of the banking system to shocks. 
However, in some cases, since conglomeration induces a strong interdependency among 
affiliated banks, the extent of contagion may be even wider if banks’ affiliation is taken into 
account than when it is ignored.  
Secondly, it shows that the measure of financial contagion depends on the pattern of 
interbank linkages. To this end, the paper applies the maximum entropy method, it re-runs 
the simulation exercises and then compares them with the results based on actual bilateral 
exposures. The comparison indicates that, in line with the thesis prevailing in the literature, 
the maximum entropy method leads to an undervaluation of the extent of contagion. 
However, this does not hold in general. Under certain circumstances, depending on the 
structure of the interbank linkages, the recovery rates of interbank exposures and banks’ 
capitalisation, the maximum entropy approach implies an overvaluation of the scope for 
contagion.  
These results have two consequences. On the empirical level, it indicates that in some 
circumstances, depending on the structure of the interbank market, the maximum entropy 
approach may not be very reliable in assessing the severity of financial contagion. 
Furthermore, since it does not provide a lower bound to contagion vulnerability, it may not 
be reliable either for assessing whether the interbank market is conducive to contagion or 
not. On the theoretical level, following Allen and Gale’s (2000) taxonomy, the comparison 
between maximum entropy and observed exposures may be interpreted as a comparison 
                                                           
7 The paper by Angelini et al. (1996) has also analysed the risk of contagion in the Italian interbank market, 
although the work takes into account only the netting system segment.   6
between complete and incomplete markets. In this respect, the results obtained in this paper 
show that complete markets are not always less conducive to contagion than other markets, 
as Allen and Gale (2000) stated.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
methodology and data. The third section deals with the vulnerability to financial contagion 
of the Italian interbank market. Section 4 investigates how the maximum entropy method 
affects the severity of financial contagion by comparing, for the Italian case, the results 
obtained on the basis of the maximum entropy matrix of bilateral exposures with those 
obtained using the observed matrix. The final section concludes and summarises the main 
findings.  
2. Data and methodology 
2.1  Data 
Data on gross bilateral interbank exposures are obtained from the Bank of Italy 
supervisory reports database. Since January 1989 all Italian banks, including their foreign 
branches, submit to the Bank Italy their end-of-month bilateral exposures to all other banks, 
foreign intermediaries included. Data refer to all kinds of interbank assets except shares. The 
database allows for a distinction between different claims (CDs, current accounts, repos, 
other loans, subordinated and unsubordinated bonds) classified according to their maturity 
(up to 18 months, over 18 months), currency of denomination and counterpart nationality 
(Italy vs. rest of the world). 
At the end of 2003, interbank exposures accounted for a substantial share of the total 
assets of Italian banks. The total amount of loans to banks and of securities issued by banks 
held by the Italian banking system was equal to 24 per cent of total assets at the end of 2003; 
it was 37 per cent for the banks in the euro area as a whole. More importantly, from the 
perspective of financial contagion, interbank exposures were over 3 times the total amount 
of capital and reserves in Italy, 6 times that in the euro area. If one considers only the 
domestic segment of the market, interbank assets were 18 per cent of total assets in Italy and 
21 per cent in the euro area. The interbank asset-to-capital ratio was respectively 2.4 and 3.5 
for the Italian banking system and the euro area banks.    7
2.2  The contagion mechanism 
All banks raising funds in the interbank market are allowed to fail one at a time. The 
losses suffered by banks lending to the failed bank are then computed. If the amount of the 
losses is greater than lenders’ tier-1 capital (i.e. capital and reserves) then lenders default. 
The simulation is then iterated by verifying if banks that fail after the first iteration make 
other banks fail as well. At each iteration banks that failed in the previous one are dropped 
from the set of banks which may be affected by contagion. The simulation continues until at 
least one bank default occurs.  
More formally, let B be the set of banks and xij  denote the funds that bank B j ∈  
borrows from bank  B i ∈ , where B B j i xij × ∈ ∀ ≥ ) , (    0  and  B i   xii ∈ ∀ =0 , by   the 
initial capital endowment of bank i , and by 
0 > i c
[ ] 1 , 0 ∈ α  the rate of loss (i.e. the incidence of 
losses due to contagion out of the interbank exposure). Finally, let  B z ∈  denote the first bank 
that defaults because of some idiosyncratic shock, and define  and as the set of 
banks, respectively, defaulted and surviving at the n-th step of the contagion path initiated by 
bank z , as follows: 
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and the process stops after N  iterations when no default occurs. 
Before commenting on some shortcomings of the contagion mechanism it is useful to 
emphasise two characteristics of the process. First, default condition (1) refers to interbank 
gross exposures instead of net ones. The main reason for this is that bilateral netting is not 
feasible because when banks fail, their liabilities are pooled and satisfied according to 
seniority. Moreover, this kind of procedure usually lasts many years. Second, simulations are 
run on unconsolidated interbank bilateral exposures. An alternative contagion mechanism 
could be based on consolidated exposures. However, consolidating interbank exposures 
would amount to assuming that, in the case in which a bank affiliated with a group fails, 
internal exposures (i.e., interbank exposures among banks affiliated to the same parent 
company) are senior to the others. On the other hand, one can define an alternative contagion 
mechanism such that banks affiliated to a group may be bailed out by their parent company if 
the consolidated tier-1 capital is larger than the losses suffered from contagion (see Section 
3.2 below).  
The contagion mechanism described above suffers from some drawbacks. In particular:     9
i)  loss rates are constant across banks and through different stages of financial 
contagion propagation and they are also not dependent on loan contract 
covenants; 
ii)  the analysis focuses on contagion only among banks operating in Italy;  
iii)  the contagion mechanism concentrates on a specific channel for contagion 
ignoring any other source which could interact with the propagation of 
contagion within the interbank market;
8 
iv)  banks are not allowed to issue shares in order to compensate for the losses they 
suffer from the failure of some interbank market counterpart;  
v)  creditor runs are ruled out.   
As far as loss rates are concerned (i), bank failures are rarely observed and therefore it 
is difficult to estimate a loss rate for interbank exposures.
9 For this reason, this paper follows 
the approach adopted by previous works (e.g. Furfine, 2003; Upper and Worms, 2004) of 
measuring the risk of contagion at different loss rates between 0 and 1. It is also assumed that 
the loss rate does not depend on the banks involved. While this assumption is not quite 
realistic, it is not easy to endogenise loss rates. The risk could be that of introducing even 
increasingly unrealistic parameters in simulations. 
The analysis focuses on contagion among banks operating in Italy (ii) because 
otherwise it would be not possible to analyze all “second-round” effects. Actually, as far as 
external interbank exposures are concerned, interbank linkages among foreign banks are not 
known. This implies that is not possible to verify whether, say, the failure of a foreign bank 
(bank i) triggers indirectly the failure of a bank operating in Italy (bank k) by causing first the 
failure of another foreign bank (bank j) that has borrowed money from the first (bank i).  
                                                           
8 For example, exposures from the payment and settlement system may provide alternative channels for 
contagion. Furthermore, loans to non-banks may amplify the effect of a bank failure by causing liquidity 
shortages and the insolvency for some borrowers which in turn may make the banking system suffer other loan 
losses. 
9 Some authors have tried to estimate the loss rates for the U.S. banking system. However, their estimates 
are very different: James (1991) has found a loss rate of 40 per cent while Kaufman’s (1994) estimate is 5 per 
cent.    10
The analysis of a more comprehensive contagion mechanism (iii) would certainly add 
to the realism of the analysis. On the other hand, by making the contagion process more 
complex it might be more difficult to isolate the contribution of each channel for contagion.  
Some of the shortcomings mentioned above would be solved if more detailed 
information were available (i-iii). On the other hand, others (iv-v) seem to be more difficult 
to tackle with as they would require a theoretical foundation that, to the best of my 
knowledge, is not yet available. 
All the drawbacks of the analysis mentioned above may affect the measure of the 
severity of contagion in a specific interbank market. However, they do not affect the 
comparison between the results based on the maximum entropy matrix of bilateral exposures 
and those based on actual bilateral exposures as they are obtained by the same contagion 
mechanism.   
3. Is the Italian interbank market vulnerable to financial contagion? 
The aim of this section is to assess whether the Italian interbank market is vulnerable 
to financial contagion. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first one (subsection 3.1), 
following the literature on financial contagion in the interbank market, addresses the issue of 
financial contagion by assuming that banks cannot react to a shock by, for example, raising 
capital to compensate for the losses suffered from the failure of their interbank counterparts. 
In the second part (subsection 3.2), parent banks are allowed to recapitalise their affiliates by 
redistributing capital resources within the conglomerate.  
3.1  The benchmark analysis 
Table 1 reports simulation results referring to December 2003.
10 Different measures of 
financial contagion propagation have been computed i) the number of banks  whose default 
causes at least one bank failure by contagion (contagious banks), ii) the number of banks 
that fail by contagion and their total assets as a percentage of the Italian banking system’s 
                                                           
10  It is worth noting that results are not affected by an end-of-year effect. Simulations for other months of 
2003 (March, June and September) have produced similar results.   11
total assets (banks failing by contagion), and iii) the number and the total assets, as a 
percentage of the Italian banking system’s total assets, of banks that never fail independently 
of the bank failing by some idiosyncratic shock (contagion-proof banks).  
Overall, the evidence indicates that financial contagion may occur in the Italian 
banking system. This result does not hold in general but depends on the bank that fails at the 
initial stage. In fact, Table 1 shows that, even for high loss rates, only a limited number of 
banks are contagious: the number of contagious banks ranges from 16 to 67, depending on 
the loss rate, out of 789 Italian banks operating at the end of 2003. It is also worth noting that 
contagious banks are not necessarily large ones. Some small bank may be contagious,   
particularly for high loss rates. On the other hand, even if the loss rate is equal to one, not all 
large banks (22 at the end of 2003) are able to make other banks fail.   
Since many banks are not contagious, the propagation of contagion is fairly limited on 
average, both in terms of the number of banks failed and their share of the banking system’s 
total assets.  
Furthermore, as far as contagion-proof banks are concerned (i.e. banks which, for a 
given loss rate and independently of the bank that initiates the contagion process, never fail) 
the results indicate that a large part of the banking system is immune to contagion. Even in 
the worst case (i.e. when the loss rate is equal to 1) banks immune to contagion represent a 
considerable share of the banking system (529 out of 789 banks; about 60 per cent of the 
banking system’s total assets).  
All in all, these results suggest that, even if contagion may occur in the Italian 
interbank market, there is little scope for financial contagion in Italy. However, one may be 
interested in other characteristics of the distribution of contagion other than mean values. 
Following previous works on financial contagion, the maximum impact of financial 
contagion (worst scenario) has also been reported in Table 1. This is the result of the failure 
of the bank that produces the maximum contagion impact. While such an event is unlikely it 
makes sense to consider it in an analysis whose aim is to quantify risks and their 
consequences. In this case, the number of banks failing by contagion ranges from 4 to 116 
and is greater than 50 for a loss rate greater or equal to 0.7; the  share of total assets of banks  
failing  by  contagion  ranges  from  0.5  to 15.9  per cent  and  is greater than 10 per cent for 












0.1 0.466 0.203 0.004 0.000 0.036 4 1 0.029 0.001 0.219 98.6 755 21 25.2 16 5
0.2 3.467 3.467 0.013 0.007 0.149 4 2 0.056 0.006 0.314 91.9 743 18 41.5 28 12
0.3 7.422 7.339 0.028 0.018 0.326 7 3 0.107 0.010 0.606 84.9 721 17 49.2 35 14
0.4 7.870 7.339 0.037 0.019 0.363 12 3 0.159 0.011 0.890 80.1 694 16 54.3 39 16
0.5 7.906 7.339 0.054 0.031 0.485 21 3 0.243 0.017 1.435 77.5 674 15 58.9 45 17
0.6 7.906 7.339 0.072 0.039 0.544 28 3 0.341 0.022 2.025 73.8 655 14 60.1 51 17
0.7 8.280 7.339 0.092 0.052 0.645 53 4 0.486 0.038 3.286 72.0 623 13 60.2 52 17
0.8 15.207 11.136 0.115 0.068 0.917 79 6 0.621 0.044 4.784 64.5 589 11 60.5 55 17
0.9 15.637 11.136 0.138 0.078 1.029 98 6 0.823 0.050 6.190 59.7 552 10 62.2 57 18
1.0 15.878 11.136 0.154 0.087 1.086 116 6 0.983 0.054 7.314 59.4 529 10 63.5 67 18
(1) Large banks are defined as banks whose total assets are at least equal to 20 billion euro. (2) Banks which are never affected by contagion. (3) Banks which make at least one bank fail.
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The effects of contagion are highly concentrated. Up to a loss rate equal to 0.7, 
financial contagion affects mainly large banks. Only if loss rates exceed that threshold do 
small banks account for a significant share of the overall extent of contagion. Large banks 
generally play a substantial role in the contagion mechanism, not only as banks initiating the 
process (i.e. contagious banks) but also as banks affected by contagion. Among large banks 
(22 at the end of 2003), most of them are contagious for a loss rate greater than 0.1.    
Large banks are relatively less important in the propagation of contagion: for a loss 
rate lower than 0.9, most of them are immune to contagion. Only in the worst scenario do 
they account for a large share of the impact of contagion when it is measured in terms of 
total assets. 
Overall these results suggest that for loss rates up to 0.7 the spreading of contagion is 
very limited. For loss rates greater than 0.7, financial contagion becomes significant, 
although it seems unable to trigger a systemic crisis.  
 
3.2  The effect of bail-outs within conglomerates 
The results obtained in Section 3.1 are based on the hypothesis that banks cannot react 
to any shock by, for example, raising capital to compensate for the losses suffered from the 
failure of their interbank counterparts. While this assumption may be quite suitable for 
stand-alone banks, it seems less appropriate for banks affiliated with a conglomerate. Indeed, 
it seems quite reasonable to assume that parent companies may recapitalise affiliated banks 
that would otherwise fail by, at least, redistributing capital resources among subsidiaries. On 
one hand, this would improve the resilience of the banking system to financial contagion 
since contagion losses are shared among all banks belonging to a group. On the other, banks 
that are not financially linked (directly or indirectly) to the bank that fails in the first step 
may suffer from losses due to financial contagion if other affiliates are financially linked to 
the bank which triggers the contagion process. 
In this section we analyse how results change if we assume that banks can be bailed 
out by other banks belonging to the same conglomerate. Simulations are still based on 
unconsolidated interbank exposures and run in the same way as before except for assuming a   14
slightly different default condition. In particular, that condition now refers to the 
consolidated capital as it is assumed that losses are now shared among banks affiliated with a 
certain conglomerate.
 11
Let   denote the set of banks affiliated with conglomerate s and  the capital of 
conglomerate s. Let bank 
s C s k
B z ∈  default. The capital of conglomerate s at the n-th contagion 
path initiated by bank z is equal to 
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1
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It is worth highlighting some important differences with respect to previous 
simulations: the default of bank z affects the solvency of bank  s C i ∈  not only because of the 
losses bank i faces in lending money to bank z , but also because of the losses all other banks 
affiliated with conglomerate s suffer in lending to bank z. In fact, all the losses suffered by 
the banks affiliated with a conglomerate s affect the consolidated capital  . This bears out 
the hypothesis that, at each stage of the contagion process, banks can be bailed out by other 
banks affiliated with the same conglomerate if the consolidated capital is greater than the 
overall amount of the losses.  
s k
When conglomerates are considered another issue arises. As there may be close 
interdependencies among banks affiliated with a conglomerate, apart from those related to 
financial interlinkages, it could be that a shock that hits one bank will hit all banks of the 
same conglomerate. Thus, in this section, the impact of financial contagion is computed 
under two different hypotheses that i) the initial shock that makes banks fail at the first stage 
is bank-specific (one bank fails), or that ii) it is conglomerate-specific (i.e. one conglomerate 
as a whole fails).  
                                                           
11 For stand-alone banks previous conditions hold.   15
Table 2 shows the results of simulations obtained for bank-specific shocks. The 
comparison with the results based on individual capital (Table 1) indicates that the effect of 
contagion is on average smaller if bail-outs within conglomerates are allowed. This reflects 
the fact that some relatively small banks can be bailed out by their parent company. Thus, 
one might conclude that banking conglomerates may lower the impact of financial contagion.  
However, this result does not hold in general. In some cases, the severity of contagion 
may be even greater. The results for the worst scenario indicate that, under the hypothesis of 
bail-outs within conglomerates, financial contagion, for loss rates ranging from 0.4 to 0.7, is 
significantly more dangerous in terms of total assets affected than in the benchmark case. 
Similarly, the total assets of contagion-proof banks account for a smaller share of the banking 
system’s total assets if loss rates are above 0.3 than in the benchmark case. This means that 
in the latter case, the impact of contagion tends to be more concentrated than in the former. 
On the contrary, the maximum impact measured in terms of the number of banks failed 
by contagion is almost always less than the impact computed when bail-outs are not allowed. 
The same holds for contagious banks.  
This evidence reflects the fact that conglomerate bail-outs have two opposing effects 
on the severity of contagion: on one hand, they imply a strengthening of subsidiaries’ capital 
position, on the other, they add another channel for contagion as banks in a conglomerate 
suffer not only from the losses due to their interbank linkages but also from the losses due to 
all the other conglomerate affiliates’ interbank exposures. The first effect is relatively greater 
for small banks, which may be more easily bailed-out by the conglomerate they are affiliated 
with. This explains why the number of failed banks tends to be lower, even in the worst 
scenario than in the case in which bail-outs are not allowed. On the contrary, this effect is 
limited in terms of the total assets affected by contagion as banks that may be bailed out are 
typically small. 
All in all, the severity of contagion when bail-outs are allowed may be even greater 
compared with the benchmark case.Table 2 
 
All banks Large banks All banks Large banks All banks Large banks All banks Large banks
0.1 0.466 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.035 4 0 0.022 0.000 0.203 98.2 760 22 19.7 11 4
0.2 0.466 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.036 4 0 0.024 0.000 0.210 98.2 759 22 23.0 13 5
0.3 0.475 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.036 5 0 0.042 0.000 0.317 98.1 749 22 31.0 18 8
0.4 12.767 11.830 0.049 0.037 0.698 19 5 0.145 0.019 1.236 78.1 712 14 35.9 23 10
0.5 12.767 11.830 0.063 0.046 0.762 19 5 0.199 0.023 1.486 67.5 682 11 41.0 26 11
0.6 12.786 11.830 0.075 0.055 0.817 20 5 0.243 0.027 1.689 67.4 670 11 47.7 31 13
0.7 12.786 11.830 0.079 0.055 0.834 28 5 0.301 0.027 2.086 65.4 643 11 47.7 31 13
0.8 12.786 11.830 0.099 0.069 0.924 43 5 0.381 0.034 2.553 50.8 599 6 48.6 35 13
0.9 12.786 11.830 0.106 0.069 0.937 58 5 0.469 0.034 3.117 49.0 566 6 53.9 41 15
1.0 12.827 11.830 0.110 0.069 0.947 73 5 0.538 0.034 3.637 46.4 534 6 56.2 49 15
(1) Large banks are defined as banks whose total assets are at least equal to 20 billion euro. (2) Banks which are never affected by contagion. (3) Banks which make at least one bank fail.
Worst scenario
Conglomerates and severity of financial contagion: bank-specific shocks
(December 2003)
Total assets                                          
(as a percentage of banking system total assets) Number of banks
Banks failing by contagion Contagion-proof banks (2) Contagious banks (3)
Loss rate Total assets      




of Banks of which:      
large banks    
(1)
of which:       
large banks    
(1)
Mean values Worst scenario Mean values
Total assets    




Std.dev.       
(all banks)
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On the other hand, given that the number of banks involved in the contagion process, 
both contagious and contagion-affected banks, is smaller it could be easier to manage a 
systemic crisis in this case. 
Apart from bail-outs, bank conglomerates may damage the resilience of the interbank 
market to financial contagion as they also raise the interdependence among banks. Table 3 
shows that, if at the first stage of simulations a conglomerate as a whole fails instead of a 
single bank, the impact of contagion is greater.  
4. Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns 
This section compares the results obtained in the previous section with those that 
would be obtained if the matrix of bilateral exposures were not known and, by following 
previous contributions, the maximum entropy method (ME) were adopted.
12 This 
comparison is important in two respects. Firstly, it sheds some light on the reliability of the 
ME approach for assessing whether the interbank market is vulnerable to financial 
contagion. Secondly, as the ME matrix represents, according to Allen and Gale’s (2000) 
taxonomy, a complete market, the comparison between the results obtained using the actual 
matrix of bilateral exposures and those based on the ME matrix may provide some evidence  
in support of the hypothesis that the pattern of interbank linkages affects the severity of 
financial contagion. 
Section 4.1, after briefly recalling the main results of Allen and Gale’s (2000) model, 
shows, in contrast, that complete markets are not necessarily less conducive to contagion 
than incomplete markets. To do this, some simple numerical examples are considered. 
Section 4.2 applies the same approach to the Italian interbank market. The results support the 
analysis of Section 4.1 indicating that in the Italian case the ME method may in certain 
overrate the vulnerability to contagion.
 












0.1 0.720 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.050 6 0 0.038 0.000 0.351 97.4 755 22 38.1 11 5
0.2 12.703 11.830 0.042 0.033 0.630 14 5 0.083 0.014 0.808 74.6 732 14 61.1 14 7
0.3 12.751 11.830 0.048 0.036 0.647 17 5 0.122 0.020 1.046 70.5 710 11 65.7 17 8
0.4 12.767 11.830 0.085 0.060 0.837 19 5 0.191 0.031 1.401 49.2 675 5 68.9 19 9
0.5 12.767 11.830 0.092 0.060 0.847 19 5 0.251 0.031 1.698 44.5 644 5 71.2 21 9
0.6 12.786 11.830 0.096 0.060 0.852 20 5 0.291 0.031 1.834 42.7 627 5 72.4 23 9
0.7 12.786 11.830 0.099 0.060 0.862 28 5 0.354 0.031 2.212 41.1 598 5 72.8 24 9
0.8 12.786 11.830 0.122 0.077 1.010 43 5 0.442 0.032 2.929 29.2 559 4 73.1 26 9
0.9 12.786 11.830 0.126 0.077 1.024 58 5 0.522 0.032 3.522 28.4 530 4 77.4 29 10
1.0 12.827 11.830 0.127 0.077 1.030 73 5 0.574 0.032 4.050 28.0 508 4 78.3 34 10
(1) Large banks are defined as banks whose total assets are at least equal to 20 billion euro. (2) Banks which are never affected by contagion. (3) Banks which make at least one bank fail. (4) Conglomerates including at least one large bank.
Number of 
conglomerates of which:      
large banks    
(1)
of which:       
large 
conglomerates    
(4)
Total assets      
(as a percentage of 
banking system 
total assets) Std.dev.         
(all banks)
Worst scenario Mean values
Std.dev.       
(all banks)
Worst scenario Mean values
Conglomerates and the severity of financial contagion: conglomerate-specific shocks
(December 2003)
Total assets                                          
(as a percentage of banking system total assets) Number of banks
Banks Failing by Contagion Contagion-proof banks (2) Contagious Conglomerates (3)
Loss rate
Total assets     
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4.1  Interbank lending patterns and the theory of financial contagion 
Recent theoretical contributions (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 
2000) have highlighted that the propagation of shocks within the interbank market is 
dependent on the exact pattern of banks’ financial linkages. Allen and Gale (2000) identify 
two key structural characteristics of the market which affect financial contagion: market 
completeness and market interconnectedness. A market is complete if each bank lends to all 
the others. On the other hand, a market is perfectly interconnected if each bank is financially 
linked to all the others, regardless of the kind of linkage, which may be both direct (i.e. each 
bank lends to all the others) and indirect (the link that a bank could indirectly establish with 
another if a third one is linked to both of them).  
Those authors point out that the more complete the market the less severe is the financial 
contagion and the more interconnected the market the more severe is the contagion. Thus, 
there is a trade-off in terms of the propagation of contagion between completeness and 
interconnectedness. These two concepts are strictly linked. A complete market is a specific 
case of a perfectly interconnected market where banks are financially linked to all the others 
only by direct exposures. Otherwise, incomplete markets may be differently interconnected: 
they may be both perfectly or partially interconnected depending on the pattern of financial 
linkages. In general, markets that are incomplete and not perfectly interconnected may differ 
both in terms of completeness and interconnectedness.  
The comparison between ME and observed interbank patterns may be interpreted as the 
comparison between complete and incomplete markets with the notable qualification that 
Allen and Gale’s (2000) model does not allow for bank heterogeneity. On the contrary, the 
ME method assumes that banks spread their lending as evenly as possible, consistently with 
their aggregate interbank assets and liabilities which may, in turn, differ considerable among 
banks. 
Let us ignore for a while the issue of bank heterogeneity, which will be dealt with later. 
According to Allen and Gale’s (2000) taxonomy, the comparison between actual and ME 
bilateral exposures may lead to the following cases, 
(a) the (actual) market is complete, 
(b) the (actual) market is incomplete but perfectly interconnected, and 
(c) the (actual) market is incomplete but not perfectly connected.   20
In the first case, the ME matrix of bilateral exposures and the observed ones coincide. 
Thus, the measure of the impact of financial contagion is not affected by the ME hypothesis. 
On the other hand, if the market is incomplete but perfectly interconnected (case b),  ME 
leads to an undervaluation of financial contagion. To show this consider Figure1, which 
represents the ME matrix of bilateral exposures under the assumption that, for each bank, 
total interbank liabilities and total interbank assets are equal.  
This assumption is needed only to simplify the maximisation of the entropy. It does not 
imply any loss of generality as contagion is based on gross exposures. Let us assume also 
that bank capital is equal to k and that a bank fails if losses exceed its capital and reserves. 
Thus, if bank A fails due to a specific shock
13 it is easy to verify that there is no contagion 
unless the loss rate is greater than 0.5 (i.e. losses are greater than k). In that case, all banks 
fail by contagion (Table 4). 
We now compare these results with those obtained for case b) (Figure 2).
14 It is easy to 
verify that all banks in the market fail if the market is incomplete and perfectly connected 
unless the loss rate is lower than 0.2 (1/6 to be precise). This confirms that, if the actual 
market is incomplete but perfectly connected, the maximum entropy method tends to 
underrate the extent of contagion (in this specific case when the loss rate ranges from 0.2 to 
0.5). 
This is due to a typical effect of risk diversification. In fact, while complete markets 
and incomplete but perfectly connected markets do not differ in terms of the number of banks 
potentially affected by contagion (as a shock may propagate from each bank to all the others 
in both cases), complete markets allow banks to better diversify credit risk than incomplete 
ones, given that each bank lends directly to all the other banks instead of holding the 





                                                           
13 In the absence of bank heterogeneity the identity of the bank that fails due to some idiosyncratic shock is 
not relevant. 
14 This corresponds to the incomplete market structure depicted in Allen and Gale’s (2000) Figure 1.   21
Figure 1 
A complete market 
(maximum entropy) 
 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Total assets
Bank A 0 2 k2 k2 k 6k
Bank B 2 k02 k 2 k 6k
Bank C 2k 2k 0 2k 6k
Bank D 2k 2k 2k 0 6k




Financial contagion: complete versus incomplete markets 
(number of banks failing by contagion) 
Complete 










market       
(fig. 3)
Complete 





market        
(fig. 4)
0.1 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 0 3 1 0 1
0.3 0 3 1 0 1
0.4 0 3 1 3 1
0.5 0 3 1 3 1
0.6 3 3 1 3 1
0.7 3 3 1 3 1
0.8 3 3 1 3 1
0.9 3 3 1 3 1
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Figure 2 
                     An incomplete but perfectly connected market 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Total assets
Bank A 06 k0 0 6k
Bank B 00 6 k 06k
Bank C 000 6 k 6k
Bank D 6k 0 0 0 6k
Total liabilities 6k 6k 6k 6k 24k
 
 
Consider now case c) as depicted in Figure3.
15 In this case it is straightforward to 
verify that the maximum entropy method does not affect the measure of contagion if loss 
rates are lower than 0.2 (1/6); it underrates the scope for contagion if loss rates range from 
0.2 to 0.5 and it overrates it for loss rates greater than 0.5.  
The reason why, in spite of lower market concentration, complete markets may , ceteris 
paribus, be even less resilient to financial contagion than incomplete ones is that, if the size 
of the interbank market is sufficiently large with respect to bank capital, there could be 
limited scope for risk diversification, especially for large loss rates, from spreading interbank 
exposures over a great number of counterparts. It is easy to verify that if the total amount of 
interbank assets held by each bank were less than 3k, complete markets would be totally 
immune to contagion, thus representing, in line with Allen and Gale (2000), the most 
resilient market structure. For larger interbank markets, the sole effect of diversification is 
that market interconnectedness rises, favouring the propagation of contagion.  
In general, for N homogenous banks the interbank assets-to-capital ratio has to be at 
least equal to (N – 1) to make the failure of a bank propagate within the market. However, 
actual interbank markets are not so large. On the other hand, according to the evidence 
provided by those authors who have resorted to the maximum entropy method, even 
complete markets are vulnerable to financial contagion. The reason for this result is that, 
                                                           
15 This corresponds to the disconnected incomplete market structure depicted in Allen and Gale’s (2000) 
Figure 3. This market is made of two totally disconnected segments: to one of them belong bank A and B, to 
the other bank C and D.   23
although markets are assumed to be complete, the ME does not rule out bank heterogeneity 
and, as shown below, the condition for contagion propagation then becomes less stringent. 
Figure 3 
An incomplete and disconnected market 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Total assets
Bank A 06 k0 0 6k
Bank B 6k 0 0 0 6k
Bank C 000 6 k 6k
Bank D 00 6 k 06k
Total liabilities 6k 6k 6k 6k 24k
 
 
To show how the resilience of the market may deteriorate when bank heterogeneity is 
allowed, let us consider the interbank market depicted in Figure 4, which is equal to the one 
represented in Figure 3 apart from the fact that banks differ in terms of interbank asset-to-
capital ratio. In this case, the identity of the bank that fails due to some idiosyncratic shock is 
not irrelevant any more. The maximum impact of financial contagion is obtained when bank 
A defaults (i.e. the bank that is better capitalised than the others). For a loss rate greater than 
0.1 the failure of bank A makes only bank B fail by contagion according to the observed 
matrix (panel a).  
On the other hand, bank A makes all other banks fail unless the loss rate is lower than 
0.3. Thus, the two matrices produce the same result up to a loss rate equal to 0.2, the 
maximum entropy method underrates the severity of contagion for loss rates ranging from 
0.1 to 0.3 and overrates the extent of contagion if the loss rate is greater than 0.3. This means 
that, by allowing for some heterogeneity in banks’ capitalisation, the maximum impact of 
financial contagion tends to be overstated for lower loss rates than in the case in which banks 
are homogenous (loss rates greater than 0.5). It may be also verified that in this case, even if 
each bank held an amount of interbank assets lower than 3k , complete markets would not be  
immune to contagion as they were in the symmetric case (Figure 1).  
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Figure 4 
 Bank Heterogeneity 
a)  observed matrix of bilateral exposures 
An incomplete and disconnected market 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Total assets
Bank A 06 k0 0 6k
Bank B 6 k 0006k
Bank C 000 6 k 6k
Bank D 00 6 k 06k
Total liabilities 6k 6k 6k 6k 24k
Capital and reserves 2k 2/3k 2/3k 2/3k 4k  
 
b)  ME matrix of bilateral exposures 
A complete market 
(maximum entropy) 
 
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Total assets
Bank A 0 2 k2 k2 k 6k
Bank B 2 k02 k 2 k6k
Bank C 2k 2k 0 2k 6k
Bank D 2k 2k 2k 0 6k
Total liabilities 6k 6k 6k 6k 24k
Capital and reserves 2k 2/3k 2/3k 2/3k 4k  
The main conclusion of this section is that, apart from the cases in which the actual 
market is complete or is incomplete and perfectly connected, ME may involve, for high loss 
rates, an overstatement of the severity of financial contagion. This may also happen more 
easily when banks are heterogeneous.
16  
This possible effect seems to be quite realistic as there are at least three reasons why 
actual interbank markets are, in general, incomplete and to some extent disconnected. First, 
the existence of informational asymmetries or, in general, transaction costs may prevent 
                                                           
16 This result is in line with Iori, Jafarey and Padilla (2006).   25
banks from fully exploiting their capacity to diversify interbank counterparts. Second, for 
banks that are affiliated with conglomerates the multiple money centre structure seems to be 
suitable to exploit economies of scale in liquidity management. Finally, in many countries 
banks differ in size considerably and therefore the assumption that the interbank market is 
made of homogenous banks seems unrealistic. 
4.2  The Italian case 
Some characteristics of the Italian interbank market suggest that it is far from being a 
complete market and that the adoption of the ME method may therefore significantly affect 
the assessment of financial contagion. Indeed, the Italian interbank market fits quite well in 
the multiple money centre structure described in Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), in which 
some banks trade with a bank (the money centre) while they do not trade with each other: at 
the end of 2003, more than two thirds of interbank claims were traded among banks 
belonging to the same group. As far as interconnectedness is concerned, banks were on 
average financially linked, both directly and indirectly through other banks, to one half of 
the total number of counterparts.
17  
The comparison of the severity of financial contagion in the Italian interbank market by 
using, alternatively, the maximum entropy (ME) matrix and the observed matrix of bilateral 
exposures (Figures 5-9) confirms that ME may provide a quite different measure of financial 
contagion.  
Figure 5 supports the hypothesis that complete markets are more resilient to contagion 
than incomplete ones, at least in terms of contagious banks. In this case, one can argue that a 
smaller number of banks have to be monitored in order to avoid the propagation of contagion 
within the banking system if the market were complete. 
Figures 6 and 7 indicate that the ME method leads, on average, to an undervaluation of 
the severity of financial contagion, both in terms of the number of banks and of the total 
assets affected by contagion, if the loss rate is not above 0.8 and 0.9, respectively. Similarly, 
according to Figures 8 and 9, ME underrates the maximum impact of financial contagion,   26
measured by the maximum number of banks failed and the maximum share of the banking 
system’s total assets affected by contagion, for loss rates not greater than 0.7.   
Figure 5 











0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Loss rates
observed bilateral exposures ME bilateral exposures
 
To sum up, the evidence suggests that in most cases ME tends to underrate the impact of 
financial contagion. On the contrary, for high loss rates ME may imply an overvaluation of 
the severity of contagion.  
A further complication is that the lowest loss rate at which ME overvaluates the severity 
of financial contagion depends on the characteristics of the market. As shown in Section 4.1, 
that critical value may also be quite low. From the previous discussion it may also be argued 
that the lowest loss rate at which ME underrates the extent of contagion is negatively related 
to the asymmetry among market participants in terms of the amount of bilateral exposures 
and to the size and the disconnectedness of the interbank market. In other words, when the 
interbank market is made up of a few big players raising funds from  many relatively small 
counterparts,  interbank  exposures account  for a large share of banks’ capital and the market  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
17 The computation of a measure of interconnectedness for the Italian interbank market refers only to those 
financial linkages such that contagion is at least possible (i.e. such that for a loss rate equal to 1, interbank 
exposures exceed bank capital).   27
Figure 6 
Banks failing by contagion
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Figure 7 
Banks failing by contagion
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Banks failing by contagion
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      Figure 9 
Banks failing by contagion
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is highly segmented, ME may then be of little help in assessing the severity of financial 
contagion as it would overstate the impact of financial contagion even for low loss rates. As a 
consequence, in that situation the ME approach might not be very reliable even for assessing 
whether a danger of financial contagion exists or not. 
The comparison between the ME and actual measures of financial contagion has been 
done by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Table 5). In particular, this test compares, for each 
bank i and a given loss rate, the severity of contagion triggered by its default ( ), computed 
on the base of the actual matrix of bilateral exposures, with the severity of contagion 
triggered by the same bank i, calculated on the base of the ME matrix ( ). The null 
hypothesis is that the median of the differences ( ) is zero. Table 5 reports the 
results for both the distribution of the number of banks failing by contagion and the 
distribution of the total assets affected by contagion. The results indicate that the ME method 
tends to provide a measure of the severity of contagion that is statistically different from the 





i i Ω − Ω
Table 5 
A test for the equality of ME and observed  
financial contagion distributions (1) 
(December 2003)  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 1.517 2.516 3.061 2.932 3.250 4.638 4.150 2.946 2.514 3.312
p-value 0.1292 0.0119 0.0022 0.0034 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 0.0119 0.0009
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 2.535 3.462 3.735 3.850 4.193 5.530 5.237 4.692 3.945 4.366
p-value 0.0112 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 1.775 1.678 2.123 2.263 2.912 3.343 3.346 2.251 2.311 3.234
p-value 0.0760 0.0934 0.0337 0.0236 0.0036 0.0008 0.0008 0.0244 0.0209 0.0012
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 2.856 2.170 2.740 3.244 3.664 4.284 4.635 4.280 4.176 4.788
p-value 0.0043 0.0300 0.0061 0.0012 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Contagious banks
Total assets affected by contagion






(1)  Distributions refers to a measure of the propagation of financial contagion in the interbank market 
computed for each bank failing by an idiosyncratic shock.   30
5. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated whether interbank linkages may be conducive to financial 
contagion. The contribution to the existing literature is twofold. Firstly, it enriches the 
evidence so far available on financial contagion by providing the first comprehensive 
analysis for the Italian interbank market. To this end, unlike previous contributions, which 
are based on ME bilateral exposures, the paper is based on a unique data set of actual 
bilateral exposures. It has also taken into account the effect of banking conglomerates in 
terms of banking system stability. This aspect has been ignored by previous works. 
Secondly, the paper compares the results obtained by using ME bilateral exposures with 
those obtained on the base of actual bilateral exposures. This allows us to show how the ME 
method widely used in the literature may affect the analysis of financial contagion. 
The main result is that: the Italian interbank market is conducive to financial 
contagion. However, even for high loss rates, the default of banks raising funds in the 
interbank market hardly triggers a systemic crisis. Only in some extreme cases does the 
severity of financial contagion seem considerable. Simulations also indicate that, by 
allowing conglomerates to recapitalise their affiliates which otherwise would fail, the 
resilience to financial contagion of the banking system tends to improve. However, in some 
cases the fact that losses are shared among banks affiliated to a conglomerate, adding 
another channel for contagion means that banking stability may even worsen.  
The paper also indicates that the maximum entropy procedure, widely adopted in 
previous contributions, may overvalue the severity of contagion. This contrasts with the 
common view that complete markets are more resilient to financial contagion. In some 
circumstances, depending on the size of the interbank market, the presence of large players, 
and the loss rate, complete markets may be even more conducive to contagion than 
incomplete ones. In that case, the benefits from diversifying the interbank exposures are 
more than counterbalanced by the costs due the fact that each bank establishes a large 
number of financial linkages, thus making a domino effect viable.  
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Appendix B 
The maximum entropy methodology for obtaining interbank bilateral exposures 
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where  are, respectively, the total amount of money bank i lends to 
other banks and bank j raises from other banks. In the absence of any assumption about the 
distribution of bilateral exposures, the matrix X cannot be identified as  unknowns 
have to be estimated.  




j ij i x l x a 1 1   ,  
N N 2
2 −
The common approach is to assume that banks maximise the dispersion of their 
interbank exposures. Following an appropriate normalisation this implies that bilateral 
exposures are given by a simple solution:  . However, this solution would imply that 
for banks that are both lender and borrower in the market they lend to themselves.  In order 
to rule out this outcome it is necessary to assume that  .  




ij = ∀ = , 0
*
The problem is then to estimate bilateral exposures such that the matrix X ˆ obtained by 
the maximisation becomes as close as possible to matrix 
* X . This is generally obtained by 
minimising the cross-entropy between the two matrices:  
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ˆ




This problem has been solved numerically using the RAS algorithm.
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